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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 In this case, we address the standard that must be 
applied at summary judgment to a plaintiff's claims of 
discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (the "ADEA").  Because we find that the 
district court erred in granting summary judgment to the 
appellee, Casio, Inc. ("Casio"), we will reverse and remand for 
trial. 
  
 I. 
 The dispute in this case involves Casio's transfer and 
termination of Gabriel Torre during the period March through 
June, 1990.  Because this case is before us upon grant of a 
summary judgment, we will explore the facts in evidence in some 
depth below.  The following sketch, however, provides the context 
for this dispute. 
 A. 
 Torre was just shy of his 52nd birthday when he was 
hired by Casio, an electronics company, in January 1983, as a 
regional sales manager ("RSM") in Casio's consumer products 
division.  He left Casio in early 1985, but when he found that 
his new job required him to travel more than he desired, he 
returned to Casio in August 1985, with full seniority rights.  
Shortly after his rehire, Torre was transferred and became RSM in 
Casio's audio/visual division ("AVD") for the eastern sales 
region, with responsibility for the East Coast of the United 
States. 
 In November 1987, Gary Hand became general manager-AVD 
and, shortly thereafter, vice-president-AVD.  In both positions 
he was Torre's direct supervisor, and he remained so until April 
1989.  At that point Barry Collins became national sales manager-
AVD, a position subordinate to Hand; as such, Collins became the 
immediate supervisor of Torre and two other RSMs in the 
audio/visual division, Mark Horowitz (age 40 in 1989) and Al 
Olsberg (age 37 in 1989). 
  
 Torre alleges that Hand caused him numerous problems 
and contends that Hand was driven by a desire to replace Torre 
with a younger manager.  Torre contends that Hand's alleged 
animus, evidence of which we will discuss below, ultimately led 
Casio on April 1, 1990, to transfer Torre, as a "subterfuge," to 
the dead-end position of "product marketing manager," from which 
he could be fired at a more propitious -- and seemingly innocent 
-- moment.  That time allegedly came on May 6, 1990, when Casio 
notified Torre that he would be terminated as part of a reduction 
in force. 
 Casio suggests a different story.  Casio contends that 
its senior management, including the company's president, John 
McDonald, and executive vice-president for planning, Eisei 
Nakagaki, came to believe that Torre should be fired after his 
name repeatedly showed up on management's "problem" list.  In 
particular, management had come to believe that Torre was lazy 
and unwilling to undertake the travel necessary to service his 
region.  Nakagaki twice instructed Collins to fire Torre, but 
Casio contends that, rather than doing as he was told, Collins 
spoke to Connie Herrel, the company's administrative 
vice-president, whose duties included, among other things, human 
resources and legal affairs.  Collins told Herrel that Torre 
would sue for age discrimination if he was terminated, and Herrel 
said that she would take care of the problem. 
 Casio further contends that, in order to save Torre 
from termination and avoid litigation expenses, Herrel designed 
the new product marketing manager position by taking advantage of 
  
certain personnel vacancies and combining responsibilities to 
create a new position which would permit Torre to stay on and 
continue to have significant duties.  The new position, Casio 
argues, satisfied both Casio and Torre:  it took Torre out of 
sales, where his performance had been criticized, and put him in 
a position that took advantage of his experience, paid him the 
same amount of money, and required less travel.  
 Casio notes that it was experiencing economic problems 
in 1989 and that the business downturn continued through 1990.  
As a result, the company was forced to reduce its labor force and 
terminate certain West Coast operations.  In the midst of this 
economic squeeze, Casio contends, one of its competitors, Zenith 
Corporation, filed charges with the United States Department of 
Commerce alleging that Casio had violated anti-dumping 
regulations.  The Commerce Department decided to initiate formal 
administrative review of the charges in mid-April 1990. 
 According to Casio, the Commerce Department 
investigation threw the company into turmoil, forcing it to 
reduce expenses and build reserves.  Thus, Casio contends, senior 
management -- specifically McDonald, Nakagaki, and Peter Owada, 
Casio's executive vice-president for finance -- met to carry out 
a directive from Casio's parent company in Japan to pare all 
unnecessary expenses.  Part of that exercise included reviewing 
the Casio organizational chart with only one criterion in mind:  
can Casio live without this person?  Casio contends that Torre 
failed that test, and was terminated as a result. 
  
 The district court found that, during the period 
January through June 1990, Casio discharged 26 employees as part 
of a reduction in force.  Of those discharged, 19 were under the 
age of 40.  Only Torre, at 59, was over 50.  Between April 1990 
and October 1991, the total number of Casio employees declined 
from 258 to 209. 
 Since Torre's termination, Casio notes, no one has 
filled the position of product marketing manager-AVD.  Also, from 
the time Torre was transferred to the product marketing manager 
position through 1992, never again had more than two RSMs in the 
audio-visual division. 
 B. 
 After his termination, Torre brought a claim of age 
discrimination before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
("EEOC"), but the EEOC rejected the claim after Casio explained 
that it had terminated Torre due to continued poor market 
conditions.  Thus, Torre brought this suit, alleging age 
discrimination in violation of the ADEA as well as state common 
law wrongful discharge.  Casio moved for summary judgment, and 
the district court granted the motion on a number of grounds:  
(1) there was no direct evidence that discrimination had 
motivated either the transfer or the termination; (2) Torre had 
failed to present a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), because he failed to 
demonstrate that he had been replaced; and (3) Casio had 
introduced evidence that its reasons for transferring and 
terminating Torre were legitimate and nondiscriminatory, and 
  
Torre had failed to introduce any evidence that the reasons 
proffered were pretextual and that the real reason for the 
transfer and termination were discriminatory.1  Torre appeals.  
The district court had jurisdiction over this case under 29 
U.S.C. § 623(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 II. 
 A. 
 Section 623(a)(1) of Title 29 of the United States Code 
provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to 
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or 
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's age."  29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).  A 
plaintiff may demonstrate age discrimination under this portion 
of the ADEA by either direct or indirect evidence.  "`Direct 
evidence of discrimination would be evidence which, if believed, 
would prove the existence of the fact [in issue] without 
inference or presumption.'"  Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907 
F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990), quoting and adding emphasis to 
Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581-82 (11th Cir. 1989).2  
                     
1
.   The district court did not specifically address Torre's 
state law claims in its opinion, but its order dismissed Torre's 
complaint in its entirety. 
2
.   An example of evidence that would be considered "direct" is 
found in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 
(1985).  In TWA, former airline captains showed that an airline's 
policy allowed those disqualified from continuing as a captain 
for any reason other than age to transfer automatically to the 
position of flight engineer, but required age-disqualified 
  
However, evidence is not direct where the trier of fact must 
infer the discrimination on the basis of age from an employer's 
remarks.  Perry v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 738 F. 
Supp. 843, 851 (D. N.J. 1989), aff'd without opinion, 904 F.2d 
696 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 958 (1990).3 
 Torre does not contend that he has presented a direct 
evidence case of age discrimination.4  Rather, he urges his claim 
under the shifting-burden analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  Appellant's Br. at 20.  (As we noted 
in McKenna v. Pacific Rail Service, 32 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 1994), 
although McDonnell Douglas was itself a race discrimination suit 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e, its shifting-burden analysis is applicable to age 
discrimination claims, as well.  McKenna, 32 F.3d at 825 n.3.)  
(..continued) 
captains to bid for engineer vacancies or retire if no vacancies 
occurred prior to their 60th birthdays.  Id. at 121.  This scheme 
directly demonstrated TWA's disparate treatment on the basis of 
age. 
3
.   When direct evidence is offered to prove that an employer 
discriminated, the shifting-burden analysis of McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (see text immediately 
following this note), is inapplicable and the case proceeds as an 
ordinary civil suit.  TWA, 469 U.S. at 121; Gavalik v. 
Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 853 (3d Cir. 1987). 
4
.   Because Torre had not clearly stated his position at 
summary judgment, the district court first evaluated Torre's 
claim as a direct evidence case and properly concluded that there 
was no direct evidence that discriminatory motives caused Casio 
to transfer or fire Torre.  Torre's counsel at oral argument 
effectively conceded that Torre has no direct evidence, but 
argued that certain episodes described in the record create a 
reasonable inference of discriminatory animus.  We address those 
episodes infra p. 20. 
  
"Under the familiar McDonnell Douglas shifting-burden analysis 
applicable to federal employment discrimination cases involving 
indirect proof of discrimination, the plaintiff bears the burden 
of proving a relatively simple prima facie case, which the 
employer must rebut by articulating a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for its actions."  McKenna, 32 F.3d at 825.  
Once the employer provides one or more justifications for its 
decision, the presumption of age discrimination created by the 
plaintiff's prima facie case is dispelled, and the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the employer's proffered reasons are pretextual. 
 As we recently noted in Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 
(3d Cir. 1994), "[a]t trial, the plaintiff [in a discrimination 
case] must convince the factfinder `both that the [employer's 
proffered] reason was false, and that discrimination was the real 
reason'" for the decision about which the plaintiff complains.  
Id. at 763, quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 
2742, 2752 (1993).  However, to survive summary judgment, a 
plaintiff need not go so far.  At that preliminary stage, a 
plaintiff may prevail "by either (i) discrediting the 
[employer's] proffered reasons, either circumstantially or 
directly, or (ii) adducing evidence, whether circumstantial or 
direct, that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating 
or determinative cause of the adverse employment action."  
Fuentes, 32 F.2d at 764. 
  
 B. 
 Two issues are presented on this appeal, both of which 
flow naturally from the shifting-burden analysis:  (1) did the 
existence of genuine issues of material fact preclude summary 
judgment on Torre's claim that he made out a prima facie case of 
discrimination by indirect evidence? (2) if Torre made out a 
prima facie case, did he also demonstrate that there were genuine 
issues of material fact in dispute concerning whether Casio's 
proffered reasons for transferring and then terminating Torre 
were pretextual or whether age discrimination actually motivated 
those decisions?5  We explore these questions below. 
 On appeal from a summary judgment, we address the case 
as if we were the district court -- that is, we exercise plenary 
review of both facts and law.  Additionally, in evaluating a 
motion for summary judgment, we must look at the record in the 
light most favorable to the nonmovant, giving that party the 
                     
5
.   Casio had also contended that summary judgment should be 
affirmed on the alternative ground that Torre had breached his 
employment agreement because he was moonlighting while employed 
by Casio.  Casio argued that it would have fired Torre had it 
known of his second job, and urged us to apply the "after-
acquired evidence" rule pioneered by certain of our sister 
circuits to bar Torre's recovery here.  See Summers v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988); McKennon v. 
Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993), 
cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2099 (1994).  However, Casio conceded 
at oral argument that its claim was barred by Mardell v. 
Harleyville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994), in which 
we found that although after-acquired evidence might have some 
relevance at the remedy stage, it cannot be used to insulate an 
employer from liability. 
  
benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from the evidence.  
Hankins v. Temple University, 829 F.2d 437, 440 (3d Cir. 1987).  
 1. 
 In evaluating Torre's prima facie case, the district 
court purported to follow our statement in Gray v. York 
Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992), that 
 [i]n the absence of direct evidence, a 
plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by 
demonstrating by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he or she (1) belongs to a 
protected class, i.e. is at least 40 years of 
age; (2) was qualified for the position; 
(3) was dismissed despite being qualified; 
and (4) ultimately was replaced by a person 
sufficiently younger to permit an inference 
of age discrimination. 
The court noted that Casio did not contest the first three prongs 
of Gray, but explained that Torre "ha[d] stipulated that he was 
not replaced as RSM-AVD after he was transferred and that Casio 
continued to operate with only two RSM's and that he was not 
replaced as Product Marketing Manager-AVD after he was 
terminated, and ha[d] conceded that that position was eliminated 
in the reduction in force."  Op. at 12-13 (footnote omitted).  
Thus, the court concluded, "[i]n a nutshell, plaintiff has not 
established a prima facie case of discrimination, and that 
failure should be game, set, and match insofar as Casio's motion 
for summary judgment is concerned."  Id. at 13. 
 We disagree with the district court's analysis.  As we 
explained in Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111 (3d 
Cir. 1983), "the nature of the required showing" to establish a 
prima facie case of disparate treatment by indirect evidence 
  
"depends on the circumstances of the case."  Massarsky, 706 F.2d 
at 118 n.13, citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13, and 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977).  While we 
noted in Gray that an ADEA plaintiff may establish his or her 
prima facie case by meeting the four criteria announced there, we 
did not conclude that those elements were inflexible.  Indeed, 
Gray grounded its choice of those elements upon Billet v. CIGNA 
Corp., 940 F.2d 812, 816 n.3 (3d Cir. 1991), Healy v. New York 
Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209, 1214 (3d Cir. 1988), and Chipollini 
v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 897 (3d Cir. 1987) (in 
banc).  While Chipollini stated that a plaintiff may prove his or 
case by demonstrating the four elements listed in Gray, both 
Billet and Healy specifically noted that the fourth element must 
be relaxed in certain circumstances, as when there is a reduction 
in force.  See Billet, 940 F.2d at 816 n.3; Healy, 860 F.2d at 
1214 n.1.6 
 Here, reformulation of the fourth element of Gray was 
appropriate.  At the time Torre was transferred and then 
discharged, the two other RSM-AVD's, Olsberg and Horowitz -- aged 
38 and 41, respectively -- were retained in their positions.7  
                     
6
.   We are not troubled by our statement in Siegel v. Alpha 
Wine Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 55 (3d Cir. 1990), that a plaintiff 
"must" prove the four elements later discussed in Gray.  This 
statement did not purport to create an inflexible rule.  First, 
our later opinion in Gray undercuts such a reading, since it 
speaks in the more flexible and permissive "may" rather than the 
mandatory "must."  Additionally, reading Siegel to create a rigid 
prima facie burden would be inconsistent with Supreme Court 
authority requiring a contextual approach. 
7
.   The district court wondered whether Torre could complain 
about his transfer as an adverse job action at all, since "1) 
  
When subsequent events made it economically impossible to hire a 
new RSM, Olsberg subsumed Torre's responsibilities.  J.A. 297.8  
Additionally, when Torre was terminated in the reduction in 
(..continued) 
plaintiff's resume describes the position to which he was 
transferred as `National Product and Marketing Manager', 
seemingly more encompassing than the position of RSM; 2) 
plaintiff experienced no reduction in pay; and 3) plaintiff was 
no longer required to travel."  Op. at 12.  It is clear, however, 
that a transfer, even without loss of pay or benefits, may, in 
some circumstances, constitute an adverse job action.  Collins v. 
Illinois, 830 F.2d 692, 702-04 & 702 n.7 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(collecting cases).  Torre has created a material fact issue 
concerning whether he was transferred from his RSM position to a 
dead-end job that had effectively been eliminated before he was 
transferred to it.  See infra pp. 22-23.  Furthermore, Torre has 
also created a material fact issue concerning whether his 
transfer and termination were part and parcel of the same 
allegedly discriminatory scheme.  See infra p. 18-20. 
8
.   Casio acknowledges that it began trying to fill Torre's RSM 
position and in fact advertised the opening.  Casio ceased such 
efforts only when it became economically unsound to hire a 
replacement.  Other circuits have routinely found such action to 
be sufficient to complete a prima facie case.  E.g., Lipsett v. 
University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 899 (1st Cir. 1988) 
(fourth element of prima facie case satisfied by showing "that 
the employer sought someone to perform the same work after [the 
plaintiff] left"); Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 996 (2d Cir. 
1985) (provided the employer sought a replacement for the 
discharged employee, "[t]he fact that [an employee's former] 
position was ultimately eliminated is of little relevance and 
should not sound a death knell to [a plaintiff's discrimination] 
claim"); Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th 
Cir. 1987) (fourth prong of prima facie case satisfied if 
employee proves that "employer subsequently replaced [the 
employee] or sought a replacement").  Given the facts discussed 
in the text, we need not decide whether mere advertisement for a 
replacement is sufficient to complete a prima facie case.  
However, assuming (without deciding) that Torre was transferred 
and terminated because of age discrimination, it is difficult to 
believe that Congress would have intended to allow Casio to 
dismiss Torre for discriminatory reasons as long as subsequent 
events made it uneconomical to hire someone to fill the spot. 
  
force, other, similarly-situated but younger employees were 
retained by Casio.9 
 Thus, younger people were not transferred when Torre 
was transferred, and younger people subsumed his duties.  
Furthermore, younger people were retained when Torre was 
terminated.  These facts suffice to complete Torre's prima facie 
case:  given Casio's concession concerning the other three Gray 
elements, if Torre's proof stopped with the facts above, he would 
carry his initial burden of "offering evidence that an employment 
decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under 
the Act."  Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358.  The inference of age 
discrimination may not be overpowering, but we cannot say that, 
as a matter of law, it is insufficient. 
 2. 
 Having found that Torre stated a prima facie case of 
age discrimination, we must turn to whether he also demonstrated 
that there were one or more material issues of fact in dispute 
concerning whether Casio's proffered reasons for transferring and 
terminating him were pretextual or whether discrimination 
actually motivated those decisions.  Although the district court 
had found that Torre failed to present a prima facie case, it too 
reached the second stage of the shifting-burden analysis and 
concluded that Torre had failed to rebut Casio's legitimate 
                     
9
.   Specifically, when Olsberg stated his intention to resign 
on May 22, 1990, Casio chose to replace him with Richard Luberto, 
age 28.  On or about June 8, 1990, Horowitz resigned, and was 
replaced by William Clark, age 41.  Luberto was subsequently 
discharged in December 1990.  J.A. 23-24, 120-21. 
  
business justifications.  We attribute the district court's 
holding, in part, to the fact that it ruled in this case prior to 
our decision in Fuentes.  Thus, the district court applied the 
wrong legal standard:  it held that "[i]n the context of a motion 
for summary judgment, plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence 
from which a rational factfinder could conclude that Casio's 
reasons are unworthy of credence and that the real motivation 
behind the transfer and/or termination was discrimination based 
on plaintiff's age."  Op. at 14-15.  As we noted earlier, under 
Fuentes, that is not so.  Instead, at summary judgment a 
plaintiff need only present evidence from which a reasonable 
factfinder could conclude either that the defendant's proffered 
justifications are not worthy of credence or that the real reason 
for the decision was discrimination.  Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. 
 Although the district court's failure to anticipate our 
decision in Fuentes influenced its analysis, the district court 
also resolved a host of material fact issues in concluding that 
Torre had failed to rebut Casio's proffered explanations for the 
transfer and termination.  The district court essentially 
accepted Casio's explanations in their entirety and failed to 
address a significant amount of the evidence presented by Torre.  
We now turn to Casio's justifications and conclude that Torre has 
raised material fact issues that required denial of summary 
judgment. 
 As we noted earlier (supra pp. 4-5), Casio offers 
innocent explanations for its decisions.  According to Casio, 
John McDonald and Eisei Nakagaki wanted Torre fired because his 
  
name kept showing up on management's problem list.  On two 
occasions, Nakagaki instructed Collins to fire Torre.  Rather 
than doing so, however, Collins went to Herrel and told her that 
Torre would sue if he was fired.  To save Torre his job and avoid 
legal costs associated with a suit, Herrel created a new position 
of product marketing manager and had Torre transferred to that 
position.  The transfer, according to Casio, was not an adverse 
job action, but rather a way to satisfy all of the parties:  
Casio would not have Torre in a front-line sales position, where 
his performance had been criticized, but would still be able to 
benefit from his substantial experience in sales.  Meanwhile, 
Torre would be paid essentially the same, would have substantial 
new duties, and would not have to travel.  (The RSM position was 
a salary-plus-commission job, while the product marketing manager 
position was a straight salaried position, but Torre does not 
contest that his expected salary remained the same after he was 
transferred.) 
 Unfortunately, according to Casio, the company's 
financial picture worsened rapidly during the period surrounding 
Torre's transfer, in part because Zenith filed anti-dumping 
charges with the Commerce Department and the government decided 
to investigate.  In an effort to cut costs, Casio claims its 
senior management, including McDonald and Nakagaki, instituted an 
age-neutral reduction in force.  Torre, along with many other, 
younger employees, fell victim to unfortunate business necessity.  
Finally, Casio stresses, there is no allegation that McDonald and 
Nakagaki, the prime movers who caused the transfer and ultimately 
  
made the decision to terminate, harbored any discriminatory 
animus towards Torre. 
 We agree with the district court that there is 
substantial support in the record for each step in Casio's 
explanation of the transfer and termination decisions.  There is 
unrefuted evidence that McDonald and Nakagaki were dissatisfied 
with Torre's performance and wanted him fired,10 and there is 
testimony and documentary evidence supporting the other 
                     
10
.   Torre stated that he did not receive any complaints about 
his job performance while he was RSM-AVD and stated that he had 
the highest sales in audio and second highest in video among all 
regions during the period he was RSM-AVD.  Torre also submitted 
an affidavit from Collins stating that Torre "performed his 
duties in an exceptional manner."  J.A. 376.  However, Casio 
submitted with its summary judgment motion a number of memoranda 
that had been sent to Torre, each of which criticized one or more 
aspects of his performance.  Id. at 254, 261, 263.  Furthermore, 
McDonald stated in his affidavit that Torre's name came up often 
in management's review of problem areas.  McDonald also stated 
that management "came to feel that [Torre] was lazy and not 
trying," that he was reluctant to travel, and that he did not 
spend sufficient time with his customers and representatives.  
Id. at 98.  McDonald also said that "[f]ollowing a number of 
meetings and having heard repeated problems with the performance 
of plaintiff's region and plaintiff's performance, especially in 
the area of not getting out to visit the accounts, Mr. Nakagaki, 
Mr. Owada and I agreed that plaintiff should be removed from his 
position."  Id. at 100. 
 
 On more than one occasion prior to March, 1990, Nakagaki 
told Collins to fire Torre because of his job performance.  J.A. 
273.  In fact, in response to a Casio interrogatory, Torre 
conceded that "sometime during the fall of 1989 Eisei Nakagaki 
told Barry Collins that Gabe Torre should be fired because he is 
not working and does not need the money.  Nakagaki further 
explained that anyone who played tennis as well as Gabe Torre 
could not be devoting his time to his job."  Id. at 275.  
Additionally, according to Collins, Nakagaki criticized Torre's 
performance before Collins on many occasions.  E.g., id. at 
271-72. 
  
contentions, as well.  Indeed, Casio's explanation for the 
transfer and termination may ultimately prevail. 
 That, however, is not the point.  Rather, looking at 
the facts in the light most favorable to Torre and drawing all 
reasonable inferences in his favor, the evidence at summary 
judgment demonstrated that he could persuade a reasonable jury 
that Casio's proffered reasons for the transfer and termination 
were not worthy of credence. 
 First, Torre notes that there was deposition testimony 
from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Hand was one of 
the decisionmakers involved in the decisions to transfer and 
terminate.  John McDonald stated in his affidavit that Hand "did 
not make the decision to transfer plaintiff and he did not make 
the decision as to which employees would be included in the 
reduction in force."  J.A. 127.  However, Collins testified that 
when he met with Hand to discuss Torre's transfer, Hand "sat down 
and told me what he was doing with [Torre]."  J.A. 252 (emphasis 
added).  Collins said that Hand "was going to move -- I can't 
tell you exactly what he said.  He was going to move Gabe inside 
and to take over the marketing duties.  I don't remember his 
exact words."  Id.  Collins then stated that Hand "said that he 
wanted to put [Torre] in a box," and "went on to say that he 
wanted to put [Torre] under a microscope, [to] wrap him so tight 
that he would have to screw up."  Id. 
 Collins followed these statements by saying that he 
"also knew that [the] decision [to transfer Torre] came [from] 
  
above [Hand]."  J.A. 252.  When pressed on this point, however, 
he stated that 
 [a]ny time you move personnel inside of 
Casio, there is a consensus of opinion.  It 
is not one individual's decision, unless that 
individual may be John McDonald, Mr. 
Nakagaki.  Ms. Herrel certainly has that 
ability.  A few people have that ability, but 
it had to be a consensus of opinion to make a 
move like that.  Gary is certainly not going 
to consult down, he is going to consult up. 
Id. 
 Collins' testimony, if credited, would undercut Casio's 
explanation that McDonald and Nakagaki were the sole instigators 
of Torre's transfer.  A reasonable jury could conclude instead 
that Collins' testimony established that Hand was the mastermind 
because he said as much to Collins.11  Additionally, although 
Collins testified that he knew that the ultimate decision came 
from above Hand, his clarification of this comment indicates that 
he did not, in fact, know that Hand did not make the decision, 
and in any event Collins' testimony would be consistent with the 
inference that Hand was the driving force behind the decision, 
"consulting up" with McDonald and Nakagaki.12 
                     
11
.   Hand's deposition testimony was ambiguous on this point:  
he stated that the transfer decision "was discussed with and was 
advised to me what the company wanted, that thought, and asked my 
idea of what I thought about moving [Torre] to that position.  I 
thought it was a great idea."  J.A. 307.  Hand also acknowledged 
that it was "possible" that he had been involved in discussions 
leading to Torre's transfer.  Id. at 592. 
12
.   Indeed, Herrel testified that when she spoke with McDonald 
about the transfer, she told him that both Nakagaki and Hand 
wanted to terminate Torre.  J.A. 612.  This testimony is 
inconsistent with McDonald's testimony that Hand was not involved 
in the process. 
  
 Collins' testimony also contradicts Casio's contention 
that, in the words of McDonald, "[a]s of April 1, 1990," when 
Torre was transferred, "Casio had absolutely no intention of 
discharging plaintiff."  J.A. 110.  According to what Hand told 
Collins, Torre's transfer was designed to be the first stage of 
his ultimate discharge. 
 Hand's involvement is material because a jury could 
reasonably conclude that he indeed harbored age-related animus 
towards Torre.  Torre presented evidence that, when Hand first 
became Torre's supervisor in 1987, he sought to replace Torre 
with a younger manager.  According to letters and an affidavit of 
a recruiter, Jerry Joseph, offered by Torre at summary judgment, 
Hand told Joseph that one candidate suggested by Joseph was 
unacceptable because he was too old, and that he did not want to 
fill Torre's position with anyone who was over age 35.  
J.A. 662-71. 
 In September of 1989,13 Torre received a message on his 
answering machine to the effect that Hand needed a report from 
Torre by the next day.  During the course of the message, Hand 
stated, "did you forget or are you getting too old, you senile 
bastard?"  J.A. 374.14 
                     
13
.   The parties disagree about when -- and indeed whether -- 
this event occurred.  The affidavits and deposition testimony 
offer conflicting reports.  Thus, for purposes of summary 
judgment, we resolve this issue in Torre's favor. 
14
.   Hand did not recall having made the comment.  J.A. 413. 
  
 Certainly, these pieces of evidence do not establish 
that age discrimination motivated the decision to transfer or 
terminate Torre.  However, if credited by a jury, these episodes 
could reasonably lead it to infer that Hand exhibited animus 
towards Torre because of his age and that he wanted to replace 
him with a younger manager.  There is also evidence from which a 
jury could reasonably conclude that Casio was aware of Hand's 
predilection for younger managers.15 
 Aside from presenting evidence that Hand was a 
decisionmaker in the transfer and termination, Torre also 
identified other potential inconsistencies in Casio's explanation 
about the transfer.  First, Torre contends that Casio has 
presented an incoherent picture of who was involved in creating 
and defining the product marketing manager position to which he 
was transferred.  Herrel testified that she was responsible for 
coming up with the new position and defining its duties, and 
testified that she did so in late March 1990.  J.A. 613.  Yet 
Torre notes that Hand signed a personnel requisition form on 
March 15, 1990, requesting Torre to be transferred to the 
position of "product manager."  J.A. 593, 607, 655.  Furthermore, 
sometime in March, Hand notified Torre that he would be 
transferred (J.A. 20) and, in early April, Hand sent Torre a 
memorandum outlining his duties as product marketing manager (id. 
                     
15
.   Specifically, Herrel testified at her deposition that she 
was assigned the task of responding to the letters from Jerry 
Joseph in 1988 which mentioned Hand's statements about wanting 
younger candidates for Torre's position.  J.A. 615-16. 
  
at 310-11).  Thus, a jury could reasonably conclude that Hand 
played a significant role in developing Torre's new post.  It 
could also conclude that Herrel's testimony attempted to minimize 
Hand's role in the transfer. 
 Torre also submitted evidence questioning whether the 
"product marketing manager" position was, in fact, a new position 
at all.  In essence, Torre's theory is that he was transferred to 
a position that had been eliminated in January 1990.  Torre notes 
that, in January 1990, Casio had terminated Roy Goldschmidt from 
his position as product manager for AVD.  At that time, Hand had 
explained to Goldschmidt that his position was being eliminated 
because projections indicated that there would not be enough 
sales volume to support the position.  J.A. 19.  Yet when Hand 
signed the personnel requisition for Torre's new position, he 
called that position "product manager" -- the same name as the 
position eliminated two months earlier.  Id. at 593, 607, 655.  
Torre also notes that administrative documents at Casio continued 
to refer to his new position as "product manager" up through his 
termination (id. at 649, 653), and that even documents created 
after his termination referred to the position as "product 
manager" (id. at 620-22). 
 Torre also questions whether his new duties were 
anything more than Goldschmidt's old duties.  Torre submitted an 
affidavit from Goldschmidt himself, who said that he performed 
all but one of the twelve duties outlined for Torre by Hand in 
his April 6, 1990 memorandum describing Torre's new position.  
J.A. 699-702.  Torre also notes that Casio provided conflicting 
  
explanations of whose jobs were being combined into the position 
created for Torre, and what the job requirements were.  Casio 
told the EEOC that the new job combined Goldschmidt's duties with 
those of Maryann Giannitto, a marketing services employee who had 
been transferred in March 1990.  J.A. 609-10.  Herrel, however, 
testified at her deposition that she combined Goldschmidt's 
duties with the duties of marketing services employee Laurie Van 
Lenten, who had resigned in January 1990.  Id. at 614.16 
 Turning to the decision to terminate, Torre points out 
that Casio's explanation for the cause of its reduction in force 
varied over time.  In a letter to the EEOC defending against 
Torre's charges, Casio stated that Torre's termination was part 
of an "across the board reduction in force" caused by "a 
continued poor market."  J.A. 660.  Before the district court 
(and again on appeal), however, Casio relied instead on 
McDonald's affidavit, in which he stated that Torre's termination 
was caused by the Commerce Department's decision to initiate the 
anti-dumping investigation.  See Appellee's Br. at 8 (citing J.A. 
115). 
 3. 
 We do not find that the facts just discussed 
necessarily demonstrate that Casio's explanation for its transfer 
and termination of Torre are unworthy of credence.  However, 
Torre has provided sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable 
                     
16
.   Both of these explanations are inconsistent with Casio's 
explanation in its brief on appeal, in which it contends that the 
position combined all three posts.  Appellee's Br. at 6. 
  
jury could conclude that, instead of trying to save Torre, Casio 
was setting him up for termination when it transferred him to a 
job that had already been eliminated once because it was 
surplusage.  A jury could reasonably conclude that Casio's 
subsequent explanations for its behavior were an effort to 
explain away Hand's role in the decision to transfer.   From the 
evidence presented at summary judgment, it would not be 
unreasonable for the jury to conclude that Torre was not 
transferred in order to save him a job, as Casio contends, but 
rather to warehouse him.  If the jury does not believe Casio's 
business justifications, it will be left with Torre's prima facie 
case and, perhaps, the conclusion that Hand harbored age-related 
animus that manifested itself in the decision to transfer Torre 
to a dead-end position from which he was terminated shortly 
thereafter. 
 Ultimately, of course, Torre has to prove that, more 
likely than not, Casio terminated him because of his age.  The 
case likely will turn on the substance and credibility of the 
trial testimony of McDonald, Herrel, Hand, and Collins.  Because 
we cannot predict the outcome of that testimony at trial, and 
because we recognize that juries are particularly suited to make 
such credibility determinations, we believe that summary judgment 
was inappropriate in this case. 
 III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district 
court's grant of summary judgment and remand for further 
proceedings. 
